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The study investigates how financial sector transparency moderates the influence of financial crises on 
bank market power across seventy-five economies between 2004 and 2014. Employing two-step dynamic 
system generalized method of moments the study shows that while public sector-led financial sector 
transparency reduces bank market power, private sector-led financial sector transparency promotes bank 
market power given that private sector-led transparency gives financial cost advantage to financially sound 
banks to solidify the market power and dominance. Similarly, while financial crises reduce the market 
power of banks implying that during financial crises banks lose their market power, financial sector 
transparency promotes the negative effect of financial crises on bank market power. This implies that 
during financial crises, financial sector transparency whether enforced through private or public sector, 
boosts the weakening effect of financial crises on bank market power. These findings imply that regulators 
can rely on financial transparency to tame bank market power to enhance banking competitiveness. The 
findings and results are consistent even when country, time and continental effects are controlled for. 
 












Banking sector competitiveness which is gauged by the level of market power of banks (Cubillas and 
Suarez, 2018; 2013; Laeven and Valencia, 2013; 2012; 2008) is critical for bank management (Mirzaei, 
2018; Berger and Hannan, 1998), access to external finance (Beck et al., 2008; 2004), financial stability 
(Mirzaei, 2018; Beck et al, 2013, 2008) and sound economic growth and development (Fernandez et al., 
2010; Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001).As such, there is a depth of literature on 
bank market power and competitiveness in the banking sector of many economies.Despite the critical 
nature of banking market power in shaping banking competitiveness in an economy, there is no consensus 
among researchers regarding the best measure to be used to gauge competition (Norhcott, 2004). 
Following prior studies (Carbo, Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux, 2009), banking competitiveness is 
measured using structural (Carbo et al., 2009; Bain, 1951) and non-structural (Iwata, 1974; Bresnahan, 
1989; Rosse and Panzar, 1987)methods. While the structural approach uses the concentration and market 
structure indicators to gauge competitiveness in the banking sector, the non-structural approach uses bank 
pricing ability to gauge competitiveness in the banking sector. 
Although acompetitive banking sector is desired to enhance innovation and growth in the sector which 
spurs economic growth (Carbo, Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux, 2009), it is impeded by information 
asymmetry, and searching and switching costs of financial market participants. For instance, information 
asymmetry creates higher switching cost for bank market participants (see Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016; Ivashina, 
2009; Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2007) making banking market participants bonded and concentrated in few 
larger and older banks (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007); This  increases the market power of such banks. 
Thus, information asymmetry within the financial sector makes few banks powerful in determining loan and 
deposit prices (price makers) and hence reduces the competitiveness in the pricing of loans and deposits. 
Similarly, Bouckaert, Degryse and Provoost (2010) show that reducing switching cost leads to increased 
competition and social welfare. Thus, several studies (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Viard, 2007; Shy, 2002) 
report similar arguments using different industries including banking and telecommunication industries. 
While Bouckaert, Degryse and Provoost (2010) advance that industries are reluctant to introducing 
mechanisms that reduce switching cost because it makes them powerful as they profit from such 
reluctance, regulators who are social welfare enforcers have attempted to maintain competitiveness 
(dampen market power) through reduction in switching cost and information asymmetry by introducing 
financial sector transparency reforms and regulations. 
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One critical regulation enforced by regulators to enhance financial sector transparency in recent times 
especially in developing and emerging markets is credit information sharing (seeAsongu, 2017; Kusi, 
Agbloyor, Ansah-Adu and Gyeke-Dako, 2017;Kusi, Agbloyor, Fiador and Osei, 2016). Thus, credit 
information sharing in the credit market translates into reduced information asymmetry (thereby enhancing 
financial sector transparency) (Asongu, 2017; Kusi, Agbloyor, Ansah-Adu and Gyeke-Dako, 2017) and 
reduced financial crises (Buyukkarabacak and Valev, 2012; Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010). This study 
argues relies on prior studies (Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016; Ivashina, 2009; Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2007) that 
increased financial sector transparency reduces the information rent fee or cost to new and young banks 
and enables them to compete with larger and older banks that have huge market power. Similarly, financial 
sector transparency frees bank clients(borrowers) to choose from a host of lenders because financial sector 
transparency reduces the bank clients’ searching and switching costs to new lenders. These reduce the 
pricing power held by large and old banks who have an informational rent advantage, leading to a more 
competitive bank sector and reduced market power. Despite these conceptual and intuitive reasonings, the 
effect of financial sector transparency on bank market power largely remains an unanswered empirical 
question. The positioning of this study is therefore to fill the apparent gap in the literature.  
Furthermore, given that financial sector transparency regulation may be enforced through the private or 
public sector and these two have varying features (see Miller, 2003) which may impact their operational 
efficiencies and effectiveness, it has become imperative to investigate which of these two improves 
competitiveness and reduces the market power of banks accordingly. That is, financial sector transparency 
enforced through the public sector is less expensive, easily accessible and may translate into reducing 
market power compared to financial sector transparency enforced through the private sector. Put 
differently, financial transparency through the private sector is more costly or expensive (see Miller, 2003) 
and hence gives banks the advantage to price their services and products a bit higher in order to pass on 
that cost to their clients. This therefore leads to increased pricing power for banks using private sector-led 
financial sector transparency.  
Moreover, following studies that show that credit information sharing which enhances financial sector 
transparency reduces financial crises (Buyukkarabacak and Valev, 2012; Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010) 
and market power (Asongu, le Roux and Tchamyou, 2019; Asongu and Biekpe 2018; Boateng, Asongu, 
Akamavi and Tchamyou, 2018) and studies that show that financial crises reduce market power (see 
Mirzaei, 2018;Shin and Chang, 2003; Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2002), it  is intuitive to inquire 
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whether or not financial sector transparency canmoderate the effect of financial crises on market power. 
Thus, this study argues that financial sector transparency modulates the effect of financial crises on the 
market power of banks. The contribution of this study includes: providing international evidence on the 
relationship between financial sector transparency on market power of banks; offering evidence on whether 
private or public sector led financial sector transparency is more effective in dealing with bank market 
power or competitiveness and presenting evidence on how financial sector transparency modulates the link 
between market power and financial crises. The contribution of this paper is hinged on how financial sector 
transparency and financial crises translate into bank competitiveness or market power in sixty-nine 
economies. The rest of the study is organized as follows. After this introduction is an overview of financial 
sector transparency and market power, followed by a literature review and insights into the methodology. 
The empirical results and discussion section is followed by another section on conclusions and policy 
implications.  
Brief Overview of Market Power and Financial Sector Transparency between 2004 and 2014 
This section reports a brief overview of market power and financial sector transparency across seventy-five 
economies between 2004 and 2014. Market power which is used to gauge banking price competitiveness 
is measured with the Lerner index and obtained from the Global Financial Development database. 
Similarly, financial sector transparency is measured as private credit bureau coverage and public credit 
registry coverage which are credit information sharing variables that offer transparency in the credit or 
banking market. Thus, private credit bureau coverage and public credit registry coverage measure financial 
sector transparency led by the private sector and public sector, respectively. The financial sector 











Table 1: Yearly Trends in Market Power, Public, and Private Sector-Led Financial Sector 
Transparency 
Year LERNER PUBLIC PRIVATE 
2004 28.602 3.334 15.126 
2005 29.027 3.955 16.446 
2006 28.433 4.294 18.643 
2007 28.22 4.574 19.495 
2008 27.128 6.388 21.025 
2009 27.948 7.034 22.354 
2010 29.675 8.151 24.259 
2011 30.336 8.963 24.264 
2012 30.2 10.18 26.695 
2013 31.834 10.445 27.51 
2014 31.958 11.764 28.588 
Average 29.396 7.189 22.219 
Sources: By Authors based on data from World Development Indicators and Global Financial Development 
Database - Notes – Lerner-bank market power; Private-private sector led financial transparency; Public-
public sector led financial sector transparency – values are in percentages (%) 
 
Table 1 presents the yearly trends in market power and financial sector transparency across seventy-five 
economies between 2004 and 2014.It is observed that market power which is measured with the Lerner 
index (and indicates the ability of banks to price their loans above marginal cost) exhibits unstable trends 
over the years under review. Thus, the ability of banks in an economy to price loans above their 
marginalcost increased from 28.602% in 2004 to 29.027% in 2005 but subsequently declined from 
29.027% in 2005 through to 27.128% in 2008. The decline seems to have coincided with the 2007-2009 
financial crises which reinforces the argument that financial crises induce regulators restructuring and 
sanitizing which improve competition (or reduce market power). Hence, the decline in market power during 
the financial crises period is not surprising. However, market power is seen to increase from 27.128% in 
2008 through to 31.958% in 2014 but marginally declined in 2012. 
In terms of financial sector transparency, it is evident from Table 1 that financial sector transparency led by 
both public and private sectors has increased constantly across the years under review. Specifically, it is 
evident that public sector-led financial sector transparency which indicates the coverage of public credit 
registries improves from 3.334% in 2004 through to 11.764% in 2014 while reporting an average  public 
sector-led financial transparency of 7.189%. Thus, financial sector transparency through public credit 
registries coverage is averagely 7.189% of the adult population. Similarly, it is observed that private sector-
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led financial sector transparency which indicates the coverage of private credit bureaus improves from 
15.126% in 2004 through to 28.588% in 2014 while reporting an average period private sector-led financial 
transparency of 22.219%. Thus, financial sector transparency through private credit bureaus coverage is 
averagely 22.219% of the adult population. Though an increasing trend in financial sector transparency is 
observed for both private and public sector-led financial transparency, the rate of increase in private sector-
led financial transparency is faster and higher compared to that of the public sector-led financial 
transparency. Interestingly, while a steady increasing trend is observed for both private and public sector-
led financial transparency, an unstable trend is observed for bank market power; hence bank 
competitiveness.  
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Theoretical Literature Review 
The literature on market power as a gauge for competition is backed by the information asymmetry theory 
(see Vives, 2019; Tian, Han and Mi, 2019; Ruiz-Aliseda, 2016; Ivashina, 2009). It is argued that information 
asymmetry increases market power through increased searching, switching and information costs (see 
Ornelas, da Silva and van Doornik, 2020; Bouckaert, Degryse and Provoost, 2010; Farrell and Klemperer, 
2007; Shy, 2002). Thus, bank clients face potentially higher lending rates when changing their lenders due 
to information asymmetry. The new lenders who do not have any credit information on the potential new 
client to judge the client’s credit worthiness would have to charge a higher interest rate to compensate for 
the risk and uncertainty surrounding that potential new borrower. In order to avoid the extra charge on bank 
clients, clients are forced to stick with one bank or lender. Over time, due to information asymmetry , clients 
are bounded to one lender or bank indirectly due to the cost of searching and switching from one lender or 
bank to another; hence increasing the market power of dominant large and old banks or lenders. For 
instance, prior studies (see Syverson, 2019; Allen, Clarkand Houde, 2019; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007) 
posit that switching costs bind customers to vendors which make it difficult to change from one supplier to 
another. 
Furthermore, a strand of literature also highlights the links between information asymmetry and financial 
crises leading to market power. The literature suggests that financial crises emanating from information 
asymmetry leads to regulator-induced restructuring and sanitization which translate into a competitive 
banking sector; hence reduced market power (Shin and Chang, 2003; Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 
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2002). This discussion is rooted in the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis (seeDemirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013; 
Baker and McArthur, 2009) which induces the intervention of regulators to sanitize the banking sector for 
improved competition and reduced market power during crises. Contrary to this opinion, studies (Cubillas 
and Suarez, 2013; Laeven and Valencia, 2008) advance that “financial crises”-induced restructuring, 
including shutdowns, mergers, and acquisitions of failed banks,may increase market power and reduce 
competition of surviving banks.  
From the above theoretical and conceptual discussions, it is obvious that information asymmetry may 
influence financial crises and market power. Following the information sharing theory (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; 1987; 1992; Freimer and Gordon, 1965) which states that sharing credit information in the credit 
market improves transparency in the financial market and reduces information asymmetry, the study 
contends that financial sector transparency information sharing institutions reduce switching cost which 
weakens market power and improves banking competitiveness.Generally, financial sector transparency is 
expected to reduce bank market power and hence improve banking competitiveness.However, financial 
sector transparency through the private sector is expected toincrease bank market power and worsen bank 
competitiveness (Miller, 2003). This is because private sector-led financial transparency comes with a cost 
which makes it costly or expensive and hence increase (decrease) market power of financially strong 
(weak) banks. Furthermore, the study contends that financial sector transparency may moderate the 
significant effect of financial crises on market power and bank competitiveness. 
Empirical Literature Review 
First, the empirical literature on transparency and market power is discussed. Second, is the literature on 
financial crises and market power. Asongu, le Roux and Tchamyou (2019) examined the role of private and 
public information sharing offices in reducing market power for financial access in 162 banks of 42 African 
economies between 2001 and 2011. Using two-stage least squares, generalized method of moments and 
quantile regression models, they find that information sharing offices which enhance transparency in the 
financial market only reduce market power in financial access when public and private information 
coverages are between 3.156% and 3.3% and  1.443 and 18.4%, respectively. Thus, there are threshold 
points within which transparency through information sharing offices may not have their desired negative 
impact on the market power of banks. Similarly, Asongu and Biekpe (2018) investigated how information 
sharing offices are complemented by information technology infrastructure to influence the market power of 
banks. Using a panel data of 162 banks in 42 African economies between 2001 and 2011, they show that 
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the interaction between internet penetration and public information sharing offices reduces market power 
while the interaction between mobile penetration and private information sharing offices increases market 
power, respectively. Despite the positive interactive term of mobile penetration and private information 
sharing offices, the net effect is negative implying that technological infrastructure can complement private 
information sharing offices to reduce the market power of banks. Moreover, Boateng, Asongu, Akamavi and 
Tchamyou (2018) investigated the role of transparency through information sharing offices on the market 
power of 162 banks from 42 African economies between 2001 and 2011. Using both dynamic and static 
estimation techniques, they find that transparency through private and public information sharing offices 
increases the market power of banks which was contrary to theoretical postulations. However, interacting 
transparency through public information sharing offices with technological infrastructure (mobile phone and 
internet) revealed the theoretical negative effect on the market power of banks, implying that information 
sharing offices reduce market power when complemented with technological infrastructure. 
 
In terms of financial crises and market power, Efthyvoulou and Yildirim(2014) examined market power in 
Central and Eastern European banking markets in the face of the 2007-2008 global financial crises and 
foreign ownership. They find that, while there is convergence in market power during the pre-crisis period, 
the onset of crises can dampen the tendency. Again, while market power appears to vary significantly with 
respect to ownership features, pre-crisis period impacts are the same for all banks regardless of ownership 
features.More so, Cubillas and Suarez (2013) analyzed the effect of banking crises on bank market power 
across 64 countries and 66 episodes of banking crises between 1989 and 2007. They provide bank-level 
and country-level evidence that after a systematic banking crisis, there is an increased level of bank market 
power consistent with higher levels of bank market concentration. More so, the higher the severity of the 
banking crises, the higher the increase in bank market power. Furthermore, whereas institutional quality 
induces a positive impact of banking crises on market, stricter regulations on banking activities and on new 
entrants into the banking market reduce the effect of the crisis on market power. 
 
Likewise, Laeven and Valencia (2013) report on a comprehensive dataset on systematic banking crises 
during 1970 and 2011 across several countries. The study presents information on costs and policy 
responses linked with banking crises arguing that increased market power of banks is associated with 
periods after banking crises. Furthermore, they show that banking crises are fueled by sovereign debt and 
currency crises although sovereign debt crisis is more costly than banking and currency crises. 
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Furthermore, Mirzaei (2018) examined the impact of global financial crises on market power in 31 banks in 
the United Arab Emirates. Employing the Lerner index and exploring the evolution of market power over 
time, it is reported that the 2007-2009 global financial crises weakened United Arab Emirates banks market 
power. Furthermore, bank-level market power during the crisis period has varying significant effects on 
market power depending on banks’ characteristics. Thus, the market power of those banks that were less 
capitalized and efficient, decreased particularly significantly during the crisis period while banks with a high 
level of market share were also unable to preserve their power. Also, Carbo, Humphrey, Maudos and 
Molynex (2009) studied banking market power and competitiveness in 14 European economies using 
different indicators of market competitiveness. They show that the different market power or competition 
indicators are providing conflicting predictions across countries, within countries and overtime arguing that 
the different market power or competitive indicators measure different things. They conclude that bank 
pricing power suggests that banking competition in Europe may well be stronger than implied by traditional 
measures and analysis.  
 
In terms of information asymmetry through switching cost and market power, Egarius and Weill 
(2016)examined the influence of switching costs in the banking sector of the three largest Eurozone 
economies between 2006 and 2012. Following the study of Shy (2002) in estimating switching costs, their 
finding suggests that a positive relationship exists between switching cost and the market power of 
commercial and cooperative banks, implying that switching cost which is fueled by information asymmetry 
increases the market power of banks. Furthermore, they observe that cooperative banks have lower client-
based switching cost. Similar to the finding of Egarius and Weill (2016), Bouckaert, Degryse and Provoost 
(2010) also show that a proportional decrease in switching cost which is induced by information asymmetry 




From the above, although theoretical and empirical evidence on factors determining the market power of 
banks is abundant, empirical studies using financial sector transparency as a market power determinant 
are limited. Thus, despite theoretical and empirical reasoning that financial sector transparency may reduce 
information asymmetry leading to reduced searching, switching and information rent costs and hence 
reduced market power, empirical evidence on this assertion is limited and scanty, especially in relation to 
11 
 
cross country data. Hence, this study hypothesizes that financial sector transparency may weakens the 
market power of banks. However, given that financial sector transparency can be enforced or implemented 
either through the public and private sectors, it is further hypothesized and argued that private sector-led 
financial sector transparency will increase the market power of banks while public sector led financial sector 
transparency will decrease the market power of banks. The study argues that private sector-led financial 
sector transparency is more costly, expensive and givesbanks the advantage of passing on that cost to 
their clients. Hence, giving banks the advantage to price their services and products higher, leading to 
increased pricing power for the corresponding banks.  
 
H1: Public Sector Led Financial Transparency reduces the market power of banks. 
 
H2: Private Sector Led financial transparency increases the market power of banks. 
 
Again, although literature provides an indication that financial sector transparency reduces banking crises 
and market power, discussions on how financial sector transparency moderates the effect of financial 
crises on market power during financial crises is less apparent. Following prior studies (fill this in) 
hypothesizes that financial crises weaken or reduce bank market power. Furthermore, the study 
hypothesizes that financial crises conditioned on financial sector transparency further weakens market of 
banks. This implies that when financial crises is interacted with private or public sector-led financial sector 
transparency, the net effect ot financial crises further reduces market power or improves banking 
competitiveness. It is against this background that this study tests the hypothesis that financial sector 
transparency can modulate the effect of financial crises on bank market power. Hence, the hypotheses to 
be tested includes: 
 
H3: Financial Crises leads to reduced market power of banks 
 
H4: Private sector led financial transparency mitigates the negative effect of financial crises on market 
power 
 




Methodology and Data 
This study employs the panel data strategy to pursue the objective of establishing the effect of financial 
sector transparency and financial crises on the market power of banks in sixty-nine economies between 
2004 and 2014. The time period used for this study is purely based on data availability of the variable of 
interest and the dependent variable. The panel data strategy is used following Brooks (2008) and Baltagi, 
Song and Koh (2003) who state that panel data is deemed to be more reliable, accurate and consistent 
because it combines the traditional time series and cross-sectional data and at the same time corrects the 
weaknesses of the traditional time series and cross-sectional data. Hence, panel data captures both the 
time and entity dimensions of the dataset, making it more convincing and reliable. While data on financial 
sector transparency is obtained from World Development Indicators, the data on country-level bank 
variables are obtained from the Global Financial Development database. Panel data strategy is expressed 
in its general form as: 
 
Yi,t=  αi + γtj + βXi,t + εi,t……..(Eq. 1), 
 
where subscriptsi and t represent entity (country) and time dimensions, respectively, with i running from 
1…N and t running from 1…T. Yitis the dependent variable, αiis scalar and constant term for all periods (t) 
and specific to a country fixed effects (i); γt is the time fixed effects t; β is a k×1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated on the independent variables; Xit is a 1× k vector of observations on the independent variables 




The study employs the dynamic generalized method of moments estimator. The dynamic generalized 
method of moments approach is normally employed where there is evidence of possible endogeneity (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). This study suspects a possible endogeneity  (reverse 
causality) between market power and financial crises. This is because while some studies show that 
financial crises influence the market power of banks (Cubillas and Suarez, 2013; Laeven and Valencia, 
2008; Shin and Chang, 2003; Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2002), other studies show that market 
power influences financial crises (Berger,Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Beck,Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2006; Allen and Gale, 2004). These empirical studies therefore indicate probable reverse causality between 
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market power and financial crises; hence a potential concern for endogeneity. To resolve the underlying 
endogeneity concern, one needs to identify instrumental variables which are correlated with the 
endogenous variable but not correlated with the dependent variable. However, identifying a good 
instrument and justifying it with the literature is difficult and nearly impossible. In the light of the concern of 
finding appropriate instruments, this study employs the dynamic generalized method of moments as it 
generates its own instruments (internal instruments). Specifically, the two-step generalized method of 
moments is employed ahead of the one-step generalized method of moments because the two-step 
generalized method of moments controls for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (see Blundell and 
Bond, 1998; Winmeijer, 2005). Hence, following the models of Cubillas and Suarez (2018; 2013) and 
modifying it (thus including financial sector transparency variables), the two-step generalized method of 
moments models are estimated as: 
 
Effect of Financial Sector Transparency on the Market Power of Banks 
LERNERi,t= β0+ β1LERNERi,t-1+ β2PUBLIC-TRANSi,t + β3FINCRISESt + β4PRIVATE-CREDITi,t+ β5BANK-
LIQi,t+ β6BANK-CAPij,t + + β7GROWTHi,t + β8BZ-SCOREi,t + β9BANK-DIVi,t+ β10BANK-COSTi,t + β11GDPGi,t 
+ β12INFLi,t + εij,t  ……………………(Eq. 2- Public Sector Led Financial Transparency), 
LERNERi,t= β0+ β1LERNERi,t-1+ β2PRIVATE-TRANSi,t + β3FINCRISESt + β4PRIVATE-CREDITi,t+ β5BANK-
LIQi,t+ β6BANK-CAPij,t + + β7GROWTHi,t + β8BZ-SCOREi,t + β9BANK-DIVi,t + β10BANK-COSTi,t + β11GDPGi,t 
+ β12INFLi,t + εij,t  ……………………(Eq. 3- Private Sector Led Financial Transparency), 
 
Effect of Financial Crises through Financial Sector Transparency on Market Power 
LERNERi,t= β0+ β1LERNERi,t-1+ β2PUBLIC-TRANSi,t + β3PRIVATE-TRANSi,t + β4FINCRISESt + β5[PUBLIC-
TRANSi,t×FINCRISESt] + β6PRIVATE-CREDITi,t+ β7BANK-LIQi,t+ β8BANK-CAPij,t + + β9GROWTHi,t + β10Z-
SCOREi,t + β11BANK-DIVi,t + β12BANK-COSTi,t + β13GDPGi,t + β14INFLi,t +  εij,t  ……………………(Eq. 4- Public 
Sector Conduit), 
LERNERi,t= β0+ β1LERNERi,t-1 + β2PUBLIC-TRANSi,t + β3PRIVATE-TRANSi,t + β4FINCRISESt + 
β5[PRIVATE-TRANSi,t×FINCRISESt] + β6PRIVATE-CREDITi,t+ β7BANK-LIQi,t+ β8BANK-CAPi,t + 
+β9GROWTHi,t + β10Z-SCOREi,t + β11BANK-DIVi,t + β12BANK-COSTi,t + β13GDPGi,t + β14INFLi,t +  
εi,t……………………(Eq. 5- PrivateSector Conduit), 
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In respect of the interaction (conduit model 4 and 5) between the financial sector transparency and financial 
crises, the study follows the arguments in Brambor et al. (2006) and test for the joint significance of the 
interactive and constitutive terms to arrive at the net effect of financial crises and financial sector 
transparency on market power of banks. For example, in equation 4 and 5, the hypothesis that the effect of 
financial crises on bank market power is conditioned on financial sector transparency (public and private 
sector-led) is tested by joint coefficients, respectively. Thus, taking the derivative of the interactive and 
constitutive terms with respect to financial crises in models 4 and 5 respectively, the net effect is obtained 
as: 𝜕𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑟𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽4 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 0………………………..(Eq.  6) 
 𝜕𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑟𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽4 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 0………………………..(Eq.  7) 
 
Hence, the nature of financial crises interacted with public and private sector-led financial transparency is 
examined by the summation of the coefficients (𝛽4 + 𝛽5) and the test of significance for the joint 
coefficients. 
 
Definition and Selection of Variables 
Lerner Index (LERNER) 
The Lerner index is employed to measure market power following the studies of Cubillas and Suarez (2018; 
2013; Amidu and Wolfe, 2016). The Lerner index measures the relative market power of banks by the 
difference between price and marginal cost expressed over the price [(price-marginal cost) / price] (Lerner, 
1934). However, the marginal cost is unobservable but derived through a translog cost function. The Lerner 
is used as the dependent variable and obtained from Global Financial Development database. 
 
Financial Sector Transparency (PUBLIC-TRANS and PRIVATE-TRANS) 
Financial sector transparency is measured by private and public information sharing institution coverages. 
Information sharing through private bureaus and public registries provide valuable information that weakens 
the information rent advantage of large banks and dampens the switching cost bank clients face when 
changing lenders. Thus, information sharing through private bureaus and public registries do not only 
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encourage new lender entrants but also grant bank clients the freedom to change or switch between 
lenders. This reduces the market power and dominance of banks and encourages a competitive banking 
environment. It is expected that financial sector transparency should reduce bank market power to induce 
competition in the banking space. However, because financial sector transparency enforced through the 
private sector is costly and expensive compared to public sector-led financial transparency, only large and 
powerful banks can afford it; hence giving them (i.e. large and powerful banks) financial advantage to 
access client transparency information. Thus, private-sector led financial transparency is expected to 
increase the market dominance of large and powerful banks while public-sector led financial transparency 
is expected to decrease the market power of banks. 
 
Financial Crises (FINCRIESE) 
In capturing financial crises, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis is employed. Following Goddard, 
Molyneux, and Wilson (2009), the financial crises is captured as a dummy which assumes a value of 1 
from2007 to 2009 and 0 for other years. Cubillas and Suarez (2018;2013) argue that financial crises induce 
restructuring (i.e., shutdown, mergers, and acquisition of failed banks), which inturn leads to greater market 
power and less competition of surviving banks. However, this study expects the opposite following Mirzaei 
(2018), Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) and Shin and Chang (2003). Thus, during financial crises,there are 
panic withdrawals and bank panics – leadingto lower confidence in the banking market and reduced 
banking activities. Hence, banks lose their pricing dominance and power and hence lower market power for 
banks.  
 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks 
Private credit by deposit money banks is used to measure the size of the banking system. It is measured as 
the ratio of private credit advanced by deposit money banks to gross domestic product. From the empirical 
literature, size is associated with both positive (Bikker and Bos, 2005; Freixas and Rochet, 1997) and 
negative (Bikker, 2004; Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras, 2005) effects on market power. Thus, 
following market structures arguments (Caminal and Matutes, 2002), when the size of the banking sector is 
made up of many small banks, a negative relationship is expected between size and market power while 
when the size of the banking sector is made up of a few large banks, a positive relationship is expected 
between size and market power. 
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Bank Liquidity Reserve(BANK-LIQ) 
Liquidity reserve is measured as bank liquidity reserve to bank assets. That is,liquidity reserves are 
required by regulators and hence used to measure liquidity regulation. Liquidity regulations are 
implemented to ensure banks have buffer liquidity in case of bank runs or panic. Thus, this ensures banks 
are liquid enough leading to a reduced ability of banks to advance more loans and hence constraints bank 
ability to advance loans and credit. This lowers the market power and dominance of banks. Put differently, 
regulations and reforms are implemented with the aim of improving banking efficiency and competitiveness 
(Bouyon, 2014) which implies reduced bank market power. From this, a negative effect is expected 
between liquidity regulation and market power.  
Bank Capital (BANK-CAP) 
Bank capital measures capital adequacy which is understood as a ratio of required capital to risk-weighted 
total assets. Following the literature on capital requirement and recapitalization (Poczter, 2016; Tahir, 
Adegbite and Guney, 2017; Deli and Hassan, 2017), increased bank capital results into improved bank 
client confidence and running of banks, leading to increased banking activities. That is, the increased 
banking activities lead to more competition and hence reduced market power and dominance of banks. 
This implies that a negative effect is expected between bank capital adequacy and market power. 
Growth (GROWTH) 
Growth is used as a measure of opportunity for growth. It is measured as year on year growth in loans and 
advances. Following Cubillas and Suarez (2013), a higher growth rate in loans and advances is expected 
to allow banks to increase their market power. Thus, the increase in loans and advances may be an 
indication of demand for loans going higher leading to increased market power and dominance for banks. 
 
Z-Score (Z-SCORE) 
Z-Score is employed as a measure of stability in the banking sector following prior studies (Beck et al., 
2013; Houston et al., 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009). It is computed as the capital to asset ratio plus 
return on assets divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. However, given that the resultant z-
score value is positively skewed, it is logged to be normalized. It is anticipated that improved stability will 
lead to increased market power (see Cubillas and Suarez, 2013). Thus, stability strengthens the financial 
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muscle of banks, promotes the confidence of bank clients in the banking sector and hence gives banks the 
edge to price higher thus leading to higher levels of market power.  
Bank Diversification (BANK-DIV) 
Bank diversification according to Cubillas and Suarez (2013) can be used to proxy for specialization as it is 
the direct opposite of diversification. Measured as non-interest income to total income, a lower value 
implies high specialization leading to increased bank market power. Thus, as banks specialize, they 
develop core competence and specialized features which make them powerful in setting prices; hence a 
negative relationship between diversification and bank market power. However, Nguyen, Skully and Perera 
(2012) advance that banks in an attempt to maintain and grow their power in a concentrated market use 
non-interest income to leverage their market power and dominance; hence a positive relationship between 
non-interest income and market power. Following the above discussion, non-interest income could either 
have a positive or negative effect on bank market power. 
Bank Cost (BANK-COST) 
Bank cost measures bank efficiency and is proxiedas operating expenses to total income. Following the 
efficiency-structure hypothesis, more efficient banks have superior management or production technologies 
leading to lower overhead costs and higher profits (see DeYoung and Rice, 2004). These efficient banks 
tend to have large market shares resulting in greater market power (see Berger, 1995). Thus, given the 
measure of bank efficiency (which is actually an inefficiency measure), a negative relationship is expected. 
Inflation (INFL) 
Inflation measures the degree of volatilities in an economy.The impact of inflation on market power is not a 
clear one a priori. Increased inflation levels oblige banks to demand a higher risk premium (Angelini and 
Cetorelli, 2003). Following Chirinko and Fazzari (2006), powerful and dominant banks have the ability to 
pass on inflation to the clients; hence a positive relation between inflation and market power. Similarly, in 
markets where banks have lower market power, the ability to transfer inflation to the client will be low and 
hence a negative relationship between inflation and market power. Thus, the relationship between inflation 





Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDPG) 
Gross domestic product growth is employed as a macroeconomic variable in addition to inflation as a 
determinant of market power. Gross domestic product is measured as year on year changes in gross 
domestic product. Gross domestic product growth is an indication for enhancement in business 
opportunities and improved citizenry welfare. Following an improvement in welfare, banks lose their pricing 
power since citizenry are well to do given the improvement in welfare and hence relies less on banks for 
support. This weakens the pricing power and dominance of banks (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003). 
 
All the variables employed in this study are summarized and reported in Table 2 for easy reference by 
readers. 
 
Table 2: Summary and Description of Variables 
Variables Measurements Indicators 
Expected 
Signs 
LERNER [Price-marginal cost]/ Price Market power  
 
PRIVATE-TRANS 
Percentage of Adult Population covered by 
private bureaus 
Financial Sector Transparency 
led by the private sector [+] 
PUBLIC-TRANS 
Percentage of Adult Population covered by 
public registries 
Financial Sector Transparency 
led by Public sector [-] 
FINCRISES 
Dummy which assumes a value of 1 for years 
2007, 2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise 2007-2009 Financial Crises [+/-] 
PRIVATE-CREDIT 
Private credit advance by deposit money banks / 
gross domestic product Size of Banking Sector [-/+] 
BANK-LIQ Liquidity Reserves / Bank Assets Bank Liquidity [-] 
BANK-COST Operational cost/total income Bank Efficiency [-/+] 
GROWTH 
Changes in loans and advances/total loans and 
advances Growth Potentials [+] 
Z-SCORE [capital-asset + ROA] / Standard deviation ROA Bank Stability [+] 
BANK-DIV Non-interest income/ total income Bank Diversification [-/+] 
INFL Consumer Price Index Economic Stability [-/+] 





Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The table captures data on the 
variables across seventy-five (75) economies in Europe, Asia, America, and Africa. From the table, the 
average Lerner index which measures the relative market power of banks in the seventy-five countries 
used in this study is 26.48% implying that banks in the seventy-five economies are able to price the 
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services and products 26.48% above their marginal cost. Compared to the average market power of 
38.44% in 64 economies used in the study of Cubillas and Suarez (2013), the mean market power of the 
present study is lower. Public and Private sector-led financial transparencies are on the average 8.065% 
and 23.133% of the adult population in the sample countries. This implies that public and private sector led 
credit information on bank client that is used by financial institutions to improve transparency in the financial 
market covers, respectively, 8.1% and 23.1% of adults in the sampled countries. Financial crises which 
captures the 2007-2009 global financial crises covers about 7.4% of the dataset sample. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics  
 Variable Obs  Mean Std.Dev.  Min  Max SWILK VIF 
 LERNER  2353 26.48 15.694 0 100 13.063*** - 
 PUBLIC-TRANS 2418 8.065 17.222 0 100 15.476*** 1.111 
 PRIVATE-TRANS 2418 23.133 34.134 0 100 12.707*** 1.392 
 FINCRISES  5778 .074 .262 0 1 6.870*** 1.145 
 PRIVATE-CREDIT 4628 44.036 44.764 0 100 16.846*** 1.930 
 BANK-LIQ 2263 22.298 23.785 .205 100 15.670*** 1.428 
 BANK-CAP 2023 16.572 5.418 1.755 48.6 12.504*** 1.268 
 GROWTH 4425 5.001 21.374 -98.417 63.343 18.015*** 1.178 
 ZSCORE  3716 2.376 .727 -4.11 4.557 12.736*** 1.159 
 BANK-DIV 3325 38.878 14.977 1.425 93.701 9.867*** 1.377 
 BANK-COST 3291 56.37 14.72 19.988 100 4.091*** 1.340 
 GDPG 5334 3.592 5.97 -64.047 88.958 16.988*** 1.236 
 INFL 4498 7.39 11.346 -18.109 98.773 17.968*** 1.238 
   
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 – values are in percentages - Notes: LERNER-bank 
market power; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by public sector; PRIVATE-TRANS-
financial sector transparency led by private sector; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises; PRIVATE-
CREDIT-size of banking system; BANK-LIQ- liquidity requirement; BANK-CAP- bank capital requirement; 
GROWTH-growth potential; ZSCORE- bank stability; BANK-DIV- bank diversification; BANK-COST- bank 
efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-economic growth; INFL-economic 
stability 
 
Credit advanced to the private sector by banks and bank liquidity reserve requirements are on the average 
44.036% and 22.298% of gross domestic product and bank assets, respectively. Bank required capital 
which measures capital adequacy for absorbing shocks is averagely 16.572% of risk-adjusted assets. 
Compared to the average capital adequacy of 35.43% in 17 European economies used in the study of 
Cubillas and Suarez (2018), the average capital adequacy of 16.572% in this present study is lower. 
Growth potential in this current study is averagely 5% while the growth potential of 19.430% is reported in 
Cubillas and Suarez (2013). This is an indication that growth potentials in the seventy-five economies used 
20 
 
in the study are lower compared to the growth potential of the sixty-four economies used in Cubillas and 
Suarez (2013). Although the Z-Score which measures banking stability is reported to have a mean logged 
value of 2.376, the logged mean values of 1.0504 and 1.3181 reported in Cubillas and Suarez (2013) and 
Cubillas and Suarez (2018) respectively, implying that banking stability in the seventy-five economies used 
in this study is higher compared to the economies in Cubillas and Suarez (2013) and Cubillas and Suarez 
(2018). Bank diversification and efficiency are reported to be 38.878% and 56.37%, respectively. These 
imply that while banks in the seventy-five economies averagely earn 38.88% of the revenue from non-
traditional revenue sources, about 56.37% of total revenue goes into settling operating expenses. In terms 
of macroeconomic indicators, inflation and gross domestic product growth are averagely reported to be 
7.39% and 3.592%, respectively.  
 
Given the values in the summary statistics table (Table 3), there is no evidence of outliers(as the variables 
were within their expected minimum and maximum ranges); hence no potential influence of outliersto bias 
the reliability, accuracy and consistency of the results and findings. Again, the normality of each of the 
variables is confirmed by the Shapiro Wilk normality test shown in Table 3. In Table 4 however, 
multicollinearity is examined. Following the rule of thumb of 0.5 threshold of multicollinearity (see Obrien, 
2007; Wichers, 1975; Kumar, 1975), there is no evidence of multicollinearity. This is further confirmed by 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) reported in Table 3 as none of the VIF values exceeded the maximum 









Table 4: Pearson’s Correlation 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
  (1) LERNER  1.000 
  (2) PUBLIC-
TRANS 
-0.069* 1.000 
  (3) PRIVAT-
TRANS 
-0.123* 0.006 1.000 
  (4) FINCRISES 0.033 -0.080* -0.050* 1.000 
  (5) PRIVAT-
CREDIT 
-0.082* 0.100* 0.370* 0.051* 1.000 
  (6) BANK-LIQ 0.034 -0.028 -0.167* -0.001 -0.344* 1.000 
  (7) BANK-CAP 0.192* -0.124* -0.212* -0.067* -0.300* 0.212* 1.000 
  (8) GROWTH  0.076* -0.070* -0.128* 0.071* -0.005 0.073* -0.005 1.000 
  (9) LNZSCORE 0.205* 0.048* -0.055* -0.004 0.093* -0.053* -0.013 -0.119* 1.000 
  (10) BANK-DIV -0.129* -0.133* -0.024 0.014 -0.054* 0.178* 0.116* -0.008 -0.165* 1.000 
  (11) BANK-
COST 
-0.447* 0.013 0.064* -0.061* -0.054* -0.055* -0.077* -0.042* -0.086* 0.155* 1.000 
  (12) GDPG 0.193* -0.062* -0.127* 0.067* -0.120* 0.034 0.051* -0.087* -0.016 0.043* -0.114* 1.000 
  (13) INFL -0.045* -0.069* -0.190* 0.022 -0.259* 0.202* 0.079* -0.002 -0.149* 0.110* 0.063* -0.011 1.000 
 
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 – values are in percentages - Notes: LERNER-bank market power; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial 
sector transparency led by public sector; PRIVATE-TRANS-financial sector transparency led by private sector; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial 
crises; PRIVATE-CREDIT-size of banking system; BANK-LIQ- liquidity requirement; BANK-CAP- bank capital requirement; GROWTH-growth 
potential; ZSCORE- bank stability; BANK-DIV- bank diversification; BANK-COST- bank efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; 








The main results of the study are reported in Tables 5 and 6. While Table 5 reports on the direct effect of 
financial sector transparency on the market power of banks, Table 6 reports on the conduit effect of 
financial crises through financial sector transparency on market power. The reports cover 75 economies 
between 2004 and 2014. In Table 5, six (6) models are reported. While all six (6) models present the effect 
of private and public sector led financial transparency on bank market power in seventy-five economies, 
Models 1-3 fail to control for technological changes, country and continental differences while Models 4-6 
control for technological changes, country, and continental differences. Similarly in Table 6 which presents 
the results on the conduit effect of financial crises through financial sector transparency on bank market 
power, Models 7and 8 fail to control for technological changes, country, and continental differences while 
Models 9 and 10 control for technological changes, country, and continental differences.  
 
From the generalized method of momentsresults in Table 5, the study finds a positive and significant effect 
of previous year bank market power on current year bank market power implying persistency in bank 
market power. Thus, previous year bank market power positively reinforces the current year’s market 
power. In terms of financial sector transparency, both significant positive and negative relationships are 
established on bank market power in all the models (Models 1-6 in Table 5 and Models 7-10 in Table 6). 
While a negative relationship between public sector led financial transparency and bank market power is 
reported implying that public sector led financial transparency erodes the market power of banks, a positive 
relationship between private sector-led financial transparency and bank market power is reported implying 
that private sector-led financial transparency promotes the market power of banks. Interestingly, both the 
positive and negative results can be explained by the literature. First, financial sector transparency (public 
sector led) through credit information sharing reduces bank market power because“public sector”-driven 
financial transparency is associated with little charges and therefore,erodes the searching, switching and 
information rent costs which make banks powerful in pricing their services above marginal cost. Hence, 
public sector led financial sector transparency reduces the market power of banks. Second, financial sector 
transparency (private sector-led) through credit information sharing promotes bank market power because 
private sector-led financial sector transparencycomes with costly or expensive charges which banks pass 
on to their clients (Tarus et al., 2012; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004) by marking-up their 
prices, leading to increased bank market power. Furthermore, one may argue that because of the cost of 
private sector-led financial trasnparency, fewer banks are able to access this service and this gives those 
who are able to access the service significant market power especially in economies where bank are 
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required by law to access or use financial sector transparency institutions in the dealings. 
Table 5: Effect of Transparency Regulation on Bank Market Power 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES Public-Trans Private-Trans Both Public-Trans Private-Trans Both 
       
LERNER(-1) 1.116*** 1.148*** 1.159*** 1.123*** 1.161*** 1.166*** 
 (0.102) (0.110) (0.111) (0.102) (0.113) (0.113) 
PUBLIC-TRANS -0.0321**  -0.0290** -0.0337***  -0.0310** 
 (0.0124)  (0.0142) (0.0124)  (0.0146) 
PRIVATE-TRANS  0.0229** 0.0223**  0.0241** 0.0227** 
  (0.00984) (0.00982)  (0.0101) (0.0102) 
FINCRISES -1.472* -1.353* -1.355* -1.434* -1.311* -1.318* 
 (0.769) (0.748) (0.751) (0.768) (0.742) (0.746) 
PRIVATE-CREDIT -0.0103 -0.0164* -0.0163* -0.00886 -0.0155 -0.0152 
 (0.00752) (0.00978) (0.00951) (0.00790) (0.0101) (0.00969) 
BANK-LIQ -0.00655 -0.0166 -0.0116 -0.0124 -0.0181 -0.0140 
 (0.0371) (0.0355) (0.0368) (0.0389) (0.0363) (0.0377) 
BANK-CAP -0.0891 -0.0825 -0.0902 -0.0549 -0.0578 -0.0664 
 (0.0566) (0.0555) (0.0560) (0.0648) (0.0636) (0.0632) 
GROWTH -4.055 -2.889 -3.416 -4.257 -3.362 -3.733 
 (2.927) (3.091) (3.047) (3.090) (3.372) (3.268) 
Z-SCORE -0.127 -0.171 -0.223 -0.395 -0.342 -0.399 
 (0.463) (0.457) (0.472) (0.510) (0.492) (0.504) 
BANK-DIV 0.0955** 0.0958** 0.0914** 0.0948** 0.0944** 0.0910** 
 (0.0432) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0430) (0.0401) (0.0397) 
BANK-COST -0.0493 -0.0479 -0.0451 -0.0687 -0.0551 -0.0566 
 (0.0600) (0.0606) (0.0609) (0.0574) (0.0606) (0.0610) 
GDPG -0.171 -0.154 -0.170* -0.201* -0.185* -0.195* 
 (0.103) (0.0970) (0.0989) (0.111) (0.106) (0.106) 
INFL -0.0292 -0.0248 -0.0237 -0.0367 -0.0310 -0.0303 
 (0.0516) (0.0563) (0.0546) (0.0503) (0.0575) (0.0552) 
Constant 0.503 -1.402 -1.165 6.142 2.565 2.856 
 (6.044) (6.043) (6.108) (5.708) (6.326) (6.356) 
Country Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Continental Effects No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes 
F-Stats 67.12*** 52.43*** 47.60*** 66.68*** 53.64*** 50.94*** 
Observations 533 533 533 533 533 533 
Number of countries 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Instruments 18 16 17 21 19 20 
AR (1) -1.76* -1.79* -1.81* -1.80* -1.84* -1.85* 
AR (2) 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 
Sargan 26.48*** 20.69*** 20.53*** 26.60*** 20.78*** 20.59*** 
Hansen 4.35 2.21 2.10 5.08 2.51 2.40 
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 – values are in percentages - Notes: LERNER-bank market power; 
PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by the public sector; PRIVATE-TRANS-financial sector transparency led by 
the private sector; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises; PRIVATE-CREDIT-size of the banking system; BANK-LIQ- liquidity 
requirement; BANK-CAP- bank capital requirement; GROWTH-growth potential; ZSCORE- bank stability; BANK-DIV- bank 




Table 6: Effect of Transparency Regulation and Financial Crises on Bank Market Power 









     
LERNER(-1) 1.161*** 1.114*** 1.167*** 1.121*** 
 (0.109) (0.0953) (0.111) (0.0960) 
PUBLIC-TRANS -0.0290** -0.0418** -0.0311** -0.0424** 
 (0.0145) (0.0172) (0.0149) (0.0168) 
PRIVATE-TRANS 0.0238** 0.0186* 0.0246** 0.0189* 
 (0.0111) (0.0102) (0.0114) (0.0101) 
FINCRISES -0.965 -2.926*** -0.850 -2.895*** 
 (1.302) (0.859) (1.304) (0.872) 
1.FINCRISES×C.PUBLIC-TRANS  0.188**  0.186** 
  (0.0896)  (0.0916) 
1.FINCRISES×C.PRIVATE-TRANS -0.0109  -0.0133  
 (0.0197)  (0.0197)  
PRIVATE-CREDIT -0.0157* -0.0143 -0.0144 -0.0133 
 (0.00912) (0.0102) (0.00929) (0.0102) 
BANK-LIQ -0.0107 -0.0158 -0.0126 -0.0189 
 (0.0367) (0.0373) (0.0378) (0.0394) 
BANK-CAP -0.0923 -0.0713 -0.0693 -0.0462 
 (0.0561) (0.0562) (0.0637) (0.0636) 
GROWTH -3.372 -3.180 -3.648 -3.487 
 (3.179) (2.886) (3.397) (3.098) 
Z-SCORE -0.228 -0.0589 -0.401 -0.270 
 (0.476) (0.426) (0.512) (0.465) 
BANK-DIV 0.0881** 0.0985** 0.0869** 0.0976** 
 (0.0406) (0.0427) (0.0392) (0.0429) 
BANK-COST -0.0439 -0.0550 -0.0549 -0.0696 
 (0.0604) (0.0565) (0.0602) (0.0549) 
GDPG -0.165* -0.149 -0.189* -0.175 
 (0.0975) (0.102) (0.105) (0.109) 
INFL -0.0247 -0.0164 -0.0310 -0.0214 
 (0.0538) (0.0484) (0.0546) (0.0482) 
Constant -1.240 -0.0776 2.707 4.686 
 (6.064) (5.850) (6.332) (5.795) 
Country Effects No No Yes  Yes  
Continental Effects No  No  Yes  Yes  
Year Effects No  No  Yes  Yes  
F-Stats 41.43*** 47.49*** 44.45*** 54.44*** 
Observations 533 533 533 533 
Number of countries 75 75 75 75 
Instruments 18 20 21 23 
AR (1) -1.81* -1.78* -1.85* -1.82* 
AR (2) 0.11 0.41 0.11 0.40 
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Sargan 19.88*** 26.81*** 19.90*** 26.95*** 
Hansen 2.13 4.37 2.46 4.91 
Net Effect -1.390* -1.781*** -1.372* -1.759*** 
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 – values are in percentages - Notes: LERNER-bank market power; 
PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by public sector; PRIVATE-TRANS-financial sector transparency led by 
private sector; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises; PRIVATE-CREDIT-size of banking system; BANK-LIQ- liquidity 
requirement; BANK-CAP- bank capital requirement; GROWTH-growth potential; ZSCORE- bank stability; BANK-DIV- bank 
diversification; BANK-COST- bank efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation. 
 
 
Again, it is observed in both Tables 5 and 6 that financial crises negatively and significantly affect bank 
market power across almost all ten models estimated. This finding indicates that during financial crises 
periods, banks lose the market power in pricing their services and products overly above their marginal 
cost. This supports existing literature that argue that during financial crises, there are bank panic 
withdrawals – leading to lower confidence in the banking market and reduced banking activities (see 
Mirzaei, 2018; Efthyvoulou and Yildirim, 2014; Shin and Chang, 2003). This makes banks lose their pricing 
dominance and power and hence lowers bank market power. 
 
Similarly in Table 6 where the study interacts financial crises with financial sector transparency on bank 
market power, it is observed that the interactive term between financial crises and private-led financial 
transparency (Models 8 and 10) and financial crises and public led financial transparency (Models 7 and 9) 
are negatively insignificant and positively significant related to bank market power, respectively. However, 
following Brambor et al. (2006), the study obtains the effect and significance of the interaction term by 
computing the net effects as illustrated in equation 6 and 7. As shown in Table 6, the net effect of financial 
crises through private and public sector-led financial sector transparency are negative implying that in an 
average private sector and public sector-led transparent economy, the reducing effect of financial crises on 
market power is propelled and weakened, respectively. Thus, while public sector-led financial transparency 
dampens the reducing effect of financial crises on bank market power, private sector-led financial 
transparency promotes the reducing effect of financial crises on bank market power. The study argues that 
because of the cost of private sector-led financial trasnparency, it reinforces the nexus between financial 
crises and market power. Similarly, because public sector-led transparency does not give an financial 
advantage to financially sound banks, it dampens the reducing effect of financial creises on market power.  
 
On control variables, private credit by banks, bank income diversification and gross domestic product 
growth rate are reported to be significant determinants of bank market power across the seventy-five 
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economies used in this study. Specifically, the size of the banking system represented as private credit 
advanced by banks reduces the market power of banks. Following the empirical literature (Bikker, 2004; 
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras, 2005), an increase in the size of the banking system in the form of 
new entrants reduces the market power of the existing banks. Hence, this finding is consistent with prior 
studies. However, the negative effect of diversification is explained following Cubillas and Suarez (2013) 
who argue that diversification, unlike specialization, weakens the development of core competence and 
expert experience which give banks the ability to dictate prices. Hence, the negative relationship between 
diversification and market power is rooted in the literature. Finally, the gross domestic product growth rate 
reduces bank market power significantly. That is, banks lose their pricing power when there is an 
improvement in the welfare of the citizenry. This is becausethecitizenry rely less on banking insitutions for 
financial assistance during good economic times. This weakens the pricing power and dominance of banks 
(Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003). 
 
Robustness and Diagnostic Checks 
To ensure consistency, reliability, accuracy, and efficiency in the results and findings of this study, a 
number of standard econometric processes and procedures are observed. Using the summary statistics 
table, the study screens for outliers and no evidence of outliers which have the potential to bias the results 
are observed from the shapiro Wilk normality result. Again, multicollinearity is screened for using Pearson’s 
correlation and the variance inflation factor (Obrien, 2007; Wichers, 1975; Kumar, 1975). That is, no 
evidence of multicollinearity is observed given that none of the paired correlations exceeded the rule of 
thumb threshold of 0.5. Moreover, by employing the two-step dynamic system generalized methods of 
moments, the study is able to control for endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. These ensure 
the results and findings are reliable, consistent and accurate. Similarly, the instruments, F-Statistics, 
Sargan and Hansen values are evidence of validity and reliability of the results. Finally, the results are 
consistent across all the models and even when the study controls for year and technological, country and 
continental effects. Thus, the results are reliable and valid. 
 
Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Recommendations 
In this study, the role of financial sector transparency in modulating the effect of financial crises on bank 
market power is examined across seventy-five economies inEurope, America, Asia, and Africa. Motivated 
by the lack of empirical studies on the interrelations between financial sector transparency and financial 
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crises on bank market power, this study employs country-level data from World Development and Global 
Financial Development databases between 2004 and 2014 to examine the underlying nexuses. This study 
employs two-step dynamic system generalized method of moments to provide evidence on these 
interrelations.  
 
The key findings are reported as follows. First, it is observed that public sector-led financial sector 
transparency has a negative effect on bank market power implying that financial sector transparency 
enforced through the public sector is effective in reducing the pricing power of banks. This finding conforms 
to both theoretical and empirical literature. Contrary to the first finding, private sector-led financial sector 
transparency has a positive effect on bank market power implying that financial sector transparency 
enforced through the private sector promotes the pricing power of banks which is contrary to the theoretical 
literature. However, this positive relationship is not surprising and can be attributed to the costly and 
expensive nature of enforcing financial sector transparency through the private sector. Thus, banks pass on 
the cost of financial sector transparency to their clients; hence increasing the price of banking services and 
products which increases their market power. Third, it is reported that financial crises represented as 2007-
2009 global financial crises reduced the market power of banks implying that during financial crises, banks 
lose their market power especially pricing power because the confidence of market players decline leading 
to less banking and financial transaction; hence loss in market power. Fourth, the interactive term of 
financial crises and financial sector transparency on bank market power has a net negative effect on bank 
market power implying that during financial crises, financial sector transparency whether enforced through 
private or public sector boosts the weakening effect of financial crises on bank market power.  Finally, on 
the control variables, the size of the banking system, bank diversification, and gross domestic product 
growth rate also have significant effects on bank market power. 
These findings have policy implications and recommendations for regulators and bank managements. First, 
while regulators are assured of relying on public sector-led financial sector transparency as a tool for 
taming bank market power to enhance banking competitiveness, regulators must have a look at private 
sector-led financial sector transparency because it does not yield the desired results on bank market 
power. Possibly, the regulator may have incorporate some of the information in private databases that do 
not exist in public databases into the public database that do not exist in  public databases into the public 
database. This will reduce the advantage of private databases. I think it is an easier and more workable 
solution. Also, regulators may have to pay attention to the structure and cost setting features of private 
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sector-led financial sector transparency. As a future research direction, researchers may have to 
investigate further the effect of financial sector transparency on stability and welfare of the citizenry. Also, it 
will be worthwhile for researchers to assess if the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny when 
bank-level data is used. 
 
 
Data Availability Statement 
The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in World Development Indicators, 
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